Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 21
Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between T def and truth criterion.
I 297
VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion.
I 276
Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant.
I 278
Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth)
Horwich I 101
Truth/Ayer: adds nothing - Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs.
I 102
They themselves are not real concepts.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

> Counter arguments against Ayer
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29