Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth no property - Tarski: Truth is a property.
I 20
Def truth / Austin: statements are true, if they are connected to things, events, etc. of the type of a given situation by descriptive conventions concerning the words (sentences) - Austin: per correspondence theory, but with convention - I 230 so that a statement can be true , a state of affairs must be similar to certain other st.o.a. - I 237 "true" is not logically superfluous as well as "vague"
I 240
Truth / Austin: "true" is used when talking about statements, not sentences. (Strawson ditto).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

> Counter arguments against Austin
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-21