Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments
V 57f Imagination/Tradition/Quine: problem: imagine the same odd and even numbers. Solution: imagination as a hypothetical nervous state. Then you do not have to fix the number of spots on a chicken you are seeing. V 178 Imagination/liveliness/Hume: liveliness: is the differentiator for imagination: memory: is attenuated sensation. Fantasy: is attenuated recollection. QuineVsHume: imagination: is an event in the nervous system that leads to dispositions. V 57/58 Imagination/Tradition/Quine: Problem: For example, if one could imagine a number that would be both even and odd. Imagination/Quine: Solution: if you take imaginary images as hypothetical nerve states, there are no such problems. Concerning a nervous state one does not have to commit oneself to e.g. the number of spots of a chicken. Idea/Concept/Berkeley/Hume/Quine: the two were not innocent and even drew the line before the abstract idea of the triangle and only allowed ideas of certain triangles. QuineVsTradition: these are vain questions about the causal connection of ideas. Psychology/Peirce: the only way to examine a psychological question is to rely on external facts. V 59 Quine: Problem: how can you do that if you only talk about outer things and not about inner things like ideas? >Ideas/Quine. Solution/Quine: by talking about language. ((s) >Semantic Ascent). V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of previous observations where the term was learned by definition rather than by conditioning. Since a defined term can be replaced by its definiendum, this results in a composite observation term. Example: "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: once for black, once for rabbit, as well as for attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of imaginary images we can say that they are evoked even if the corresponding object is not present. Now, however, we must go further and require even more skills: the child must distinguish between two types of imaginary images: a) Imagination. b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: has made little convincing reference to liveliness as a distinguishing feature. Def Memory/Hume: is attenuated sensation. Def Imagination/Hume: is weakened memory. >Memory/Quine. Def Imagination/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for corresponding stimulation. This indicative nerve process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned elements such as "black" and "rabbit". b) Strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. through a real previous encounter with a black rabbit. Is the basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and to the calendar clock and, if applicable, to a location. Is a complex observation term. Protocol Sentence: is a timeless sentence (of eternal duration) if place and time data are complete._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |