|Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
A discourse on mental images is not less intersubjectively as a discourse on objects.
If having this imagination is constructed with the help of my ability to describe descriptions or images of imagination, then these descriptions are not descriptions or representations of the idea, but rather imagination descriptions and imagination representations.
What happens is rather the replacement of alleged statements about imaginations by statements about objects and events.
Imagination image: is not an intangible image but a skill.
I can, for example, say to the extent that I have a horse-imagination, as I am able to draw a horse, or to describe it.
Sometimes this is uncertain and the linguistic reports cannot always be taken at face value. The request to describe a given imagination as such is easily confused with the request to tell of what the imagination is.
The "imagination" and the "image in consciousness" have disappeared. The dangers and the difficulties of interpretation increase when rotation and the like is mentioned. There must be a speech on rotation, which does not presuppose that there are images that swirl around in the head._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997