Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Graeser I 34
Ideas / Frege / Graeser: from the fact that ideas are subjective, it does not follow that their respective contents must also be subjective.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002


> Counter arguments against Frege
> Counter arguments in relation to Imagination



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23