Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Gareth Evans on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments

Evans I 313
Reference/Significance/General Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we constantly use general terms, of which we have only the darkest idea of the conditions of fulfilment. e.g. chlorine, microbiology etc.
But it is wrong to say that we say nothing when we utter sentences containing these general terms.
I 314
Evans: For example, to express the idea that there are people with eleven fingers, general terms are sufficient.
If the psychological state (mental state) includes an object, a general term will appear in its specification. This could be linked to the concession that there are certain objects to which one could refer more directly: the theory must even accept this, because otherwise it could not allow what appears to be possible: reference in a symmetrical or cyclical universe.
EvansVsDescription theory: This idea of psychological attitudes directed towards objects obviously owes a lot to the feeling that there must be something we can say about what is meant, even if no suitable object can be found.

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Frank I 515
Imagination/Evans: regardless of the ways to gain knowledge on the subject.


Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-25
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