|Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 145
Interesting are those cases which imply token identity, but not reducibility. E.g. I try to fall asleep and count sheep, but the 3rd, 9th, 10th and 11th of 12 animals are not sheep, but goats. (> elms/beeches)
Glüer II 171ff
But these classifications do not help if I want to formulate interesting laws or hypotheses that go beyond the observed cases. E.g. that the goats have horns. I can pick out every single sheep and goat of my imagination, but because of "conceptual poverty" I cannot generally seperate the sheep from the goats.
... one can neither have the idea of one's own self nor anything else before one has the idea of other subjects and a common world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993