Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
II 145
Interesting are those cases which imply token identity, but not reducibility. E.g. I try to fall asleep and count sheep, but the 3rd, 9th, 10th and 11th of 12 animals are not sheep, but goats. (> elms/beeches)
---
II, 171ff
But these classifications do not help if I want to formulate interesting laws or hypotheses that go beyond the observed cases. E.g. That the goats have horns. I can pick out every single sheep and goat of my imagination, but because of "conceptual poverty" I cannot generally seperate the sheep from the goats.
... one can neither have the idea of one's own self nor anything else before one has the idea of other subjects and a common world.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Imagination



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29