Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Completeness: Completeness typically refers to the property of a system where all necessary elements or operations exist, ensuring that every statement is either provable or disprovable within that system. See also Incompleteness, Definiteness, Determination, Distinction, Indistinguishability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Completeness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 270 Particular/universal/completeness/introduction/Strawson: in what sense is a thought in relation to a particular complete, but not of a unversal? >Particular/Strawson, >Universal/Strawson. Too vague: particular = construction of facts. Universal = abstraction from facts. >Abstraction. Not even thought of a kind of particular-U as an example, which serves as a "substratum". >Substratum. Solution: at the end of facts must be that the particular is not included as a component inclued. Then we have a complete thought. But it is incomplete if we move on to the particular because this is part of a further fact. "Last facts": only feature-localizing statements like "here is water", etc. >Facts/Strawson, >Terminology/Strawson._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Completeness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20