Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously - SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green) - then both have the same T# -correlated functional role.
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I 276
N.B.: here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition - it is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. -"if p is true, one believes that p" - N.B. -"p" exists inside and outside the belief context - Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p - Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role.
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I 34
All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. - Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception.
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I 38
BurgeVsFolk Psychology BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. - In w he has a correct use of "Arthritis"- then, he has in w not the believe that he has arthritis in his thigh - (because this belief is false). - N.B.: in w he is in exactly the same T* -correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. - Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. - But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Folk Psychology



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28