Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
V 36
Causation/counterfactual analysis/Lewis: (elsewhere) 1) relation cause/effect depends on the causal chain. - 2) causal chain is a particular type of counterfactual dependencies - 3) No reverse causation.
V 181
Causation/Lewis: E.g. assuming two redundant systems, one produces the effect with lower probability - I switch to that one. - Then I have caused the effect nevertheless. - Wrong: to assume that there would be several ways of how the world could be. (Various counterfactual conditionals). - Lewis: That would be a metaphysical burden. - It is not about a hidden property that might be present or not.
V 183
There is only one way the world is. - Both counterfactual conditionals are true or false by an arbitrary resolution of semantic indeterminacy. - But that is not a property of the world.
V 195
Redundant causation/Lewis: (multiple causes, which would also have been sufficient individually). - It is hard to decide whether the effects would have been different events. - Definition fragile: is an event that would have been different if it had been e.g. at a different time. - Events must not be too fragile. - Otherwise we have normal causation in redundant cases. - Whether redundancy is present may also depend on the standards of fragility. - Undecidable: E.g. whether a suspended performance is the same.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-25