Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options. For the understanding of signs and words plays a role, whether one can connect an object with the word or sign, as well as whether one can replace the sign or word with another sign or word. In order to understand full sentences, the context must be grasped as well. A point of contention is whether knowing the truth conditions gives the sentence its meaning. In other words Whether there is the knowledge about what should be if the sentence were true. If that is correct, there is no need to know whether the sentence is true (cf. M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992, p. 20). See also substitution, truth conditions, knowledge.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Danto I 63
Definition understanding/Wittgenstein: understanding of truth conditions. To what refers the subject when his sentence is true. One does not need to know that the sentence is true, only what would be the case if it would be. Usually it takes more than understanding alone to know whether a sentence is actually true.
Dummett I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding is no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege)
Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences.
Hintikka I 373
Understanding/Wittgenstein: is not a feeling-word. - Also propositional attitudes are no feelings.
II 46
Understanding/Wittgenstein: actually a translation.
II 300
Color/Understanding/Wittgenstein: to understand the word "yellow" it is not necessary that something yellow exists. - There also must not be anything, that's a foot long, because the measure is so long.
II 301
It depends on the language game, if one says, one must have been able to see green to determine: "this is not green."
VI 223
Understanding/understanding/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (Philosophical Investigations § 242): this includes not only accordance with the definitions, but also with the judgments.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-23