|Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options.
For the understanding of signs and words plays a role, whether one can connect an object with the word or sign, as well as whether one can replace the sign or word with another sign or word. In order to understand full sentences, the context must be grasped as well. A point of contention is whether knowing the truth conditions gives the sentence its meaning. In other words Whether there is the knowledge about what should be if the sentence were true. If that is correct, there is no need to know whether the sentence is true (cf. M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992, p. 20). See also substitution, truth conditions, knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Def understanding/Stalnaker: thesis: we understand the informational or propositional content in terms of distinguishing between options - Def metaphysics: this concerns the distinctions that need to be made between options. - Def semantics affects our ability to represent options and to distinguish between them. - Representation: we can only judge it if we know how our logical space is structured. - Descriptive semantics: asks what the semantic value of expressions is. - Basic semantics: Based on which facts do they have it. - Metaphysical: inconceivable.
Understand/Stalnaker: a proposition can not be misunderstood like a sentence, it is already the content._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003