Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options.
For the understanding of signs and words plays a role, whether one can connect an object with the word or sign, as well as whether one can replace the sign or word with another sign or word. In order to understand full sentences, the context must be grasped as well. A point of contention is whether knowing the truth conditions gives the sentence its meaning. In other words Whether there is the knowledge about what should be if the sentence were true. If that is correct, there is no need to know whether the sentence is true (cf. M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992, p. 20). See also substitution, truth conditions, knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Jürgen Habermas on Understanding - Dictionary of Arguments
III 152 Understanding/action/sociology/Habermas: there is a problem of rationality when understanding actions, because the different types of action (teleological, dramaturgical and communicative action) presuppose different relations of the actor to the world. >Actions/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. III 159 Sociology must seek an understanding approach to its field of objects, because it contains processes of understanding through which the field of objects has in a way already constituted itself. The social scientist encounters symbolically pre-structured objects; they embody the structures of pre-theoretical knowledge with the help of which subjects capable of speech and action have produced these objects. The waywardness of this pre-structured reality (...) is contained in the generation rules according to which the subjects produce the social context of life directly or indirectly. Examples are acts of speech, purposeful activities, cooperations and sediments of these utterances such as texts, traditions, documents, works of art, theories, goods, techniques, etc. Speaking and acting are the unexplained basic concepts. >Basic terms, >Method. III 160 In order to understand the lifeworld, the social scientist, who has no access to it other than the layman, must be able to participate in its production in general. >Lifeworld. III 170 Communicative actions cannot be interpreted in two steps, i. e. first of all to be understood in their factual course of events and then compared with an ideal-typical course of events. III 171 Instead, the interpreter must assume a divided basis all the time, which he/she has in common with the one to be judged. III 173 If we assume that there is a possibility of mutual criticism between the observer and the actor,... III 174 ...the distinction between descriptive and rational interpretation becomes meaningless. The rational interpretation is here the only way to open up the factual process of communicative action. >Hermeneutics/Habermas. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. From the speaker's perspective, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions of his/her illocutionary success. Acceptability is not defined in an objective sense from the perspective of an observer, but from the performative attitude of the communication participant. III 403 We need to broaden our perspective to the context of interaction so that we can identify fulfillment conditions under which the listener can connect his actions to the actions of a speaker. However, knowledge of the "fulfillment conditions" is not sufficient to know when an expression is acceptable (see Acceptability/Habermas). For this we still need knowledge of the conditions for an agreement. III 404 Imperative: in the case of imperatives involving a claim to power of the speaker, i.e. a possible sanctioning, we must know the sanction conditions. IV 400 Understanding/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Thesis: Understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action can be expanded, organizationally mediated and rationalized, but not replaced and thus mechanized by media in the areas of life that primarily fulfil functions of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization. >Agreement/Habermas. - - - Gaus I 157 Understanding/Habermas/Bohman: 'Formal pragmatics' is Habermas's term for a general account of the capacity of a speaker to use and understand speech acts correctly: 'the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and action, who are attributed the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves capable of distinguishing (at least intuitively) between valid and invalid expressions' (1990(1): 31). Bohman: the intuitive knowledge of a competent speaker permits them to engage in second-order evaluation in asking for justification or reasons for various sorts of validity claims that are implicit in utterances; to understand an utterance is to know its 'acceptability conditions'. While validity claims may remain implicit so long as communication is unproblematic and ongoing, competent speakers may also demand that the implied warrant be redeemed and demand explicit justification in second-order communication (communication about communication, or 'discourse' proper) in order to reach an understanding. Critical function/Bohman: such a reconstruction of implicit know-how may have a critical function in so far as it can specify when speakers violate the conditions of rationality implicit in communicatively successful utterances. 1. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Habermas
> Counter arguments in relation to Understanding
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18