Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options.
For the understanding of signs and words plays a role, whether one can connect an object with the word or sign, as well as whether one can replace the sign or word with another sign or word. In order to understand full sentences, the context must be grasped as well. A point of contention is whether knowing the truth conditions gives the sentence its meaning. In other words Whether there is the knowledge about what should be if the sentence were true. If that is correct, there is no need to know whether the sentence is true (cf. M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992, p. 20). See also substitution, truth conditions, knowledge._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Understanding - Dictionary of Arguments
I 150 ff Frege: Understanding comes before truth. - Truth is undefinable (FregeVsTarski). Dummett: in earlier works thesis: the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. Today: the relationship is more subtle. Neither of the two can be explained by the other respectively. We can also express our understanding by means of other words. (Replacement, interchangeability.) - - - Husted IV 457 On the other hand it cannot apply generally that the understanding of expressions has the form of explicit knowledge and consists in the ability to explain expressions with other expressions. For this would result in a circle. Husted IV 458 ff Understanding: there are limits: we can only attribute an understanding to ourselves if we can show how to express it. The (metaphysical) realist must therefore show how our understanding (ultimately behavior) discloses that sentences are either true or false (even if we cannot decide). And that’s not possible. Husted IV 463 Understanding: the linguistic understanding of a person cannot include a component that could not be expressed in the use of the language. ((s) Cf. >Gavagai). - - - II 69 Understanding/Dummett: knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient to understand a sentence. II 69 For knowing the truth conditions of a proposition, knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient. This condition is too weak. What we need is the speaker's understanding of the language. What does it mean to know a language? And this is derived from the understanding of the individual words. What does the speaker know when he knows a language and especially when he knows a certain sentence? That is of course practical knowledge. But that does not mean that it is not propositional knowledge! Mastery of procedures can always be presented propositionally. So we are looking for a theoretical representation of a practical skill. II 111 Understanding/Meaning Theory/Dummett: what would be a verification of the sentence - important argument: we need not be able to decide the sentence in order to understand him - 1) Two Dogmas Vs: most sentences involve inferences - 2) Vs: if truth is a basic concept, then there is no reason why we should know enough to deduce the meaning of a complex sentence from the constituents. - - - III (b) 70/71 Understanding/Truth/Dummett: in order for a sentence to be used for communication of information it must be possible to understand it before you know whether it is true - Transparency: if you attribute one meaning to two words each, one must know whether these meanings are the same - but: someone who grasps the sense (meaning) of two expressions, does not need to know that they have the same reference. III (b) 83 Language/Meaning/Dummett: E.g. exchange "table" with "eagle": then sentences such as "female tables lay eggs" etc. So the hoax is uncovered - Prerequisite: we already know sentences that do not contain "table" and "eagle"! -((s) > Löwenheim-Skolem.) - You cannot assume a theory (collection of true sentences at a time) without an additional meaning theory. III (c) 96 ((s) If all sentences contained "table" and "Eagle", then the meaning of the other words in these sentences could depend on these two words)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Understanding
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19