|Understanding: the ability to give reasons for a distinction or to justify a selection of options. See also actions, meaning, knowledge.|
Books on Amazon
|I 150 ff
Frege: Understanding before truth - truth indefinable (FregeVsTarski).
Dummett: in earlier works thesis: the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.
Today: the relationship is more subtle. Neither of the two can be explained by the other respectively.
We can also express our understanding by means of other words. Replacement, interchangeability.
On the other hand it cannot apply generally that the understanding of expressions has the form of explicit knowledge and consists in the ability to explain expressions with other expressions. For this would result in a circle.
II 458 ff
Understanding: there are limits: we can only attribute an understanding to ourselves if we can show how to express it. The (metaphysical) realist must therefore show how our understanding (ultimately behavior) discloses that sentences are either true or false (even if we cannot decide). And that’s not possible.
Understanding: the linguistic understanding of a person cannot include a component that could not be expressed in the use of the language.
EMD II 69
Understanding/Dummett: knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient to understand a sentence.
EMD II 111
Understanding/Meaning Theory/Dummett: what would be a verification of the sentence - important argument: we need not be able to decide the sentence in order to understand him - 1) Two Dogmas Vs: most sentences involve inferences - 2) Vs: if truth is a basic concept, then there is no reason why we should know enough to deduce the meaning of a complex sentence from the constituents.
Dum III 70/71
Understanding/Truth/Dummett: in order for a sentence to be used for communication of information it must be possible to understand it before you know whether it is true - Transparency: if you attribute one meaning to two words each, one must know whether these meanings are the same - but: someone who grasps the sense (meaning) of two expressions, does not need to know that they have the same reference.
Language/Meaning/Dummett: E.g. exchange "table" with "eagle": then sentences such as "female tables lay eggs" etc. So the hoax is uncovered - Prerequisite: we already know sentences that do not contain "table" and "eagle"! -> Löwenheim-Skolem - you cannot assume a theory (collection of true sentences at a time) without an additional meaning theory.
(S) If all sentences contained "table" and "Eagle", then the meaning of the other words in these sentences could depend on these two words).
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989