|Reason, philosophy: reason (German “Vernunft”, prudence) is the ability to get insight. The concept of reason in this sense is distinguished in the German Idealism from the concept of reason in the sense of “Verstand” (subtlety), whereby the latter refers to the recognition of regularities and differences and the former refers to the justification of principles which are the basis of the regularities. See also mind, spirit, idealism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Rorty II 82
Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas draws a sharp boundary between reason and sensation.
Practical Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas (according to Rorty) demands really heavy philosophical ammunition according to Kant's model: only transcendental presuppositions of any possible communicative practice can be sufficiently strong to fulfill the task. It needs a universally available human capability called practical reason that shows us what is an arbitrary distinction between people, and what is not.
Rorty: That cannot be Rawls' intention. No superordinate "source of authority", no independent kingdom of morality. For Rawls, practical reason is rather a procedural than a substantive question.
RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to replace "communicative reason" in the place of "subject-centric reason" is itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000