|Connectives: connectives are also called logical connectives or logical particles. E.g. and, or, if, then, if and only if. Negation also counts as a connective. See also truth value table, truth table._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Interpretation/Putnam: is not a representation, but production. - E.g. classical connectives are not represented using the intuitionistic connectives, but the classical theorems are produced. - Putnam: the meaning of the connectives is still not classic, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not by truth. - Change of meaning: e.g. assuming we wanted to formulate Newton's laws in intuitionistic mathematics, then we would have to limit the real numbers (for example, on the 30th decimal).
Then, in the classical theory, the connectives would refer to "provability in B1" and in the other to "provability in B2". Then the connectives would change their meaning when knowledge changes.
Realism/Putnam: the realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not solely true because it follows a (any) theory.
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified reasonably - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn: if you do not believe in convergence but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectives intuitionistically and apprehend truth intra-theoretically.
Truth/Logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives is not determined by their formal logic ->holism ->Quine: the distinction between the entire theory and individual statement meanings is useless.
_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990