Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Verificationism - Dictionary of Arguments
VII (b) 37 Verification Theory of Meaning/Peirce/Quine: the method of empirically determining the confirmation or refutation of a statement is its meaning. Then an analytical statement is the boundary case that is confirmed no matter what the case is. Synonymy exists when the method of empirical confirmation or refutation is the same. This is then about cognitive synonymy of statements, not generally about linguistic forms. ((s) Terms below the sentence level). Meaning/Term/Cl.Lewis/Quine: Meaning of an expression: "a criterion in mind" mental criterion (criterion in mind) in relation to which one is able to accept or reject the expression in the face of a fact. (Cl. I. Lewis 1948,p.133). VII (b) 38 Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke). Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it. Quine: that is ambivalent between: Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as a) event b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned. Verification Theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning, VII (b) 39 to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression. VII (b) 40 Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance VII (b) 41 or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory. Quine thesis: (comes from Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis). Two Dogmas/Quine: the verification theory thus shows us the intimate connection of the two dogmas of empiricism: 1. Analytic/Synthetic and 2. Reductionism. - - - X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a proposition would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning. QuineVsPeirce: that also equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic order: is here the totality of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some knowledge theorists would catalogue these alternatives by introspecting the sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve irritation (at the nerve ends). Problem: one cannot clearly assign the sensory evidence to individual sentences ((s) formulations). (Indeterminacy of empiricism). - - - XI 76 Def Synonymy/Verification Theory/Meaning/Lauener: according to verification theory, two statements are synonymous if the method of their empirical verification is the same. Def Analyticity: is then the borderline case where there is no need for a method of confirmation. - - - XII 11 Verificationism/Quine: what is its status? Ultimately, the theory of meaning must also be empirical. Because analyticity is not tenable, the verification theory of meaning is not tenable either. XII 96 Verification Theory/Quine: the Viennese Circle did not advocate verification theory strongly enough. Problem: many sentences are theoretical. Thus the concept of facts has no meaning! Subject Matter/QuineVsSubject Matter/QuineVsWittgenstein: the term has no meaning, because most propositions are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But this is not a problem for the verification theory of meaning. Verification theory of Meaning/Quine: pro: the kind of meaning necessary for language learning and translation is the empirical meaning and nothing more. XII 105 Epistemology/Quine: thus becomes semantics. But it still revolves around observation (because of the verification theory of meaning). If we go beyond the observation sentences, epistemology merges with psychology and linguistics. >Verification, >Confirmation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16