Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. McDowell on Verificationism - Dictionary of Arguments
II 47/48 Verificationism/Dummett: Contradictory term to McDowell's sense which is based on truth: the doctrine that mastery of language is acquired only through the acquisition of linguistic behavior. Problem: Bivalence - if we accept it, then no behavior in undecidable sentences is possible - this is typical for the realism. >Realism. Solution/Dummett: justifiable assertion. >Assertibility/Dummett, cf. >Antirealism. II 62 Verificationism/McDowell: Problem: The meaning of the concepts of truth and falsehood cannot be acquired by means of evidence (how one acquires concepts usually). However, evidence for the truth of sentences (so both together). >Truth criterion, >Evidence. McDowellVs: because a non-empirical Tarski theory is included by the theory of sense, it does not follow that susceptibility for evidence is excluded, it is necessary for the attribution of beliefs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |
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> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Verificationism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18