Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
EMD II 112ff
Disjunction/Verification/Meaning Theory/Dummett: quite different than in the intuitionist logic: e.g. it was either an even or odd number of geese on the Capitol - should not have to guarantee that any one of the disjuncts can be verified - then the law of the excluded middle is assertible even if the sentence itself is undecidable.
EMD II 123
Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: results from the assumption that we cannot have any concept of a fact that we cannot see - Important argument: then the non-occurrence of a non-discernible fact is not in itself another fact -> anti-realism) - then the fact that an assertion cannot be seen as neither correct nor incorrect is to be shown sufficiently that it can be neither correct nor incorrect - that only leads to bivalency in realism.
EMD II 126
Verific. Meaning Theory/Correctness/Realism/Anti-Realism/Dummett:
a) Verificationist meaning theory: truth conditions visible: then two options:
1) assertion correct if shown that it is impossible to be incorrect -
2) incorrect, if not displayable as correct
b) Realism: truth conditions not visible: then there is no difference, because the incorrectness conditions always exist if the correctness conditions do not exist, and vice versa - II 126 but even here incorrectness prevails.
EMD II 126
Verificationist Meaning Theory/Dummett: needs only effective, decidable concepts - (not realistic) - but neither classical nor intuitionistic logic!
EMD II 126
Meaning Theory/Verification/Logical Form/Dummett: double negation: ~~A l- A and l-A > ~~A but not A l- ~~A - also: l- A v ~A, l- ~(A & ~A), ~(A & B) -ll- ~A v ~B, ~(A v B) l- ~A & ~B, but not: ~A & ~ B l- ~(A v B).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-18