Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Verificationism, philosophy: verificationism is, in the narrower sense, the view that the meaning of statements consists through the method of their verification (their confirmation). It follows that statements which cannot be verified are ultimately meaningless. See also anti-realism, realism, empiricist sense criterion.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Stroud I 199f
Verificationism/Carnap: we cannot understand anything that cannot be proven true or false. - StroudVs: this failed, even as the attempt to pick out the empirically verifiable sentences. - Problem: verification methods and sentences that somehow involved "theory". - Or "inferred entities". - ((s)> theoretical entities.) - Stroud: but our concepts and our minds are not so strictly tied to "sensory experience". - (VsLogical Positivism). - Solution: verificationism would have had to explain how we confirm our belief by experience. - That did not work. - Then skepticism would have been defeated. - Verification principle (V.P.) and skepticism have the same problem. How our beliefs are empirically confirmed. - Skepticism is not refuted by the verification principle if we do not know if we are dreaming.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


> Counter arguments against Carnap
> Counter arguments in relation to Verificationism



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-16