Dictionary of Arguments

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Behavior, philosophy: behavior ist the set of observable changes in the describable state of living organisms that are initiated by these organisms themselves, or which are a reaction to external stimuli, in which there is a certain choice of the reaction. Flanking thoughts do not belong to behavior, since an arbitrary extension of the frame of reference would make a determination of the behavior impossible. See also behaviorism, psychology, mentalism, naturalism, observation.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Avr 151 I
Behavior / Armstrong / Avramides: first has to mean: physical conduct. - Otherwise, circular. - In contrast, actual behavior: / Armstrong: also refers to the mind.
Avr 157 I
actual behavior / Armstrong / Avramides: is interpreted behavior that can be seen only by a subject in other subjects. - Avramides: third-person viewpoint. - No God standpoint or neurophysiology. - I 159 Then the spirit can not be only contingently connected to behavior. - A subject can never be separated from his experience. - However, without significant reference to behavior.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-17
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