Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Comparisons, philosophy: here, we are concerned with the conditions under which it is possible to make comparisons. Objects which do not share any properties are not comparable. A comparison always refers to a singled out property among several properties embodied by more than one object. The prerequisite for comparisons is a consistency of language usage. See also analogies, description levels, steps, identification, identity, change, meaning change, ceteris paribus, experiments, observation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
D. Lewis on Comparisons - Dictionary of Arguments
V 5f Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences. Analysis 1: only one most similar world. LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds. Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. V 21 Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i). >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Comparability. - - - Explanation/(s): E.g., The Bizet/Verdi case: They could have been compatriots if a) Bizet had been Italian or b) Verdi had been French. Problem: Which world is closer to our world? Therefore a similarity metric for possible worlds is not achievable._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |