Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II (b) 47
Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities.
- - -
Martin II 126
Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between U-instantiations - Arm: not formal, more like meaning postulate - no mysterious necessary J between separate things - II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection - II 128 Question. Connection betw. U itself 2nd-stage U?
Martin II 128
Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particle) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept
Martin II 129
MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things.
- - -
II (d) 149
Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Armstrong

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-19
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration