Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 129f
Color/vagueness/Wright: shades could be characterized as "accepted" the description as "vague". One could denote something as "red", without being obliged to it. But should one say then that this has both mandatory and permissive moves? Or should we rather conclude that it is wrong to speak of "borderline cases" that permit decisions, but do not prescribe anything?
Definition Vagueness: does not mean the existence of an "inbetween realm".
Vagueness/Wright: is rather the fact that the contrast between what "red" prescribes and that what "not red" prescribes, is not clear everywhere. Also ambiguous shades contrast with unambiguous. ((s) WittgensteinVs, sorites).
Vagueness/convergence/conditions/criteria/Wright: Could there not be a completely permissive discourse? It is clear that the contrast between conditions, that allow an assertion and such for which nothing applies, cannot be completely permissive itself.
  Otherwise, there could be no information without additional information. Nothing would be excluded by the "correctness" of such an information ("per se"). There would be nothing then in which this correctness could exist.
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EMD II ~ 226
Vagueness/sorites/Wright: the existence of borderline cases does not include blurred boundaries - blurred boundaries instead blurry in logical space - Frege/Russell: lack of our language - WrightVs: vague predicates merely partial functions - consistent with a sharp distinction between cases where applicable and where not - not lack of instruction, but demand I that the borders are not drawn - continuity of the world.
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II 230
Not reflex of our mental weakness.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24