Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Vagueness, philosophy: there are descriptions of objects or situations that are necessarily not fully determined. For example, the indication whether a given hue is still red or already orange is not always decidable. It is a property of the language to provide vague predicates. Whether vagueness is a property of the world is controversial. See also sorites, indeterminacy, under-determinateness, intensification, penumbra._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Vagueness - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 228 Vagueness/language/Lewis: not the language is vague, but the use. - E.g. David Kaplan: the sun is not colder than Sirius, when the sun is not cold "in a sense". Language: is not vague itself! But the use of language by individuals or communities, conventions, etc. is vague. I.e. not a point, but a fuzzy region is marked in space. 1) For example, suppose that the only vagueness concerns "warm" and "cold" as extensional adjectives. Then the indices should have a descriptive coordinate of a positive real number, as the limit temperature between cold and warm things. >Extension. I.e. at an index i the extension of "cold" is the set of things with the temperature less than or equal to this value (at the world and time coordinates). Vagueness: a vague extension "this is cold" is true, among some but not all descriptions (delineations). But propositions with vague constituents are not necessarily vague. Example "This is cold or warm but not both". >Disjunction/Lewis. IV 229 The description coordinate is not contextual. It is similar to the determination coordinate in that we generalize over it rather than fix it. We could say that a proposition is true over a set s of descriptions at an index i, then and only if for every index i' the equal i is except perhaps at the description coordinate, the proposition is true at i' then and only if the description coordinate i' belongs to s. >Truth/Lewis, >Measuring, >Degrees. Truth/Grade: given a normalized measure function ...+. Notice: the degree of truth of a truth-functional construct of propositions is not a function of the degrees of truth of its constituents. Example "x is cold" and "x is warm" can be both true to degree 5 at an index i, but "x is cold or x is cold" is true to degree 5 at an index while at the same index "x is cold or x is warm" is true to grade one. Vagueness: Example "possibly" is related to the world coordinate. Vagueness: Example "in a sense" form ...+ ... Vagueness: Example "__er than": Form: ((C/C)/N)/(C/C). Intension: "x is colder than y" is true at an index if the set of descriptions under which "y is cold" is true at i, a true subset is the set of descriptions under which "x is cold" is true at i. It follows that the Sun is not colder than Sirius unless "in one sense" the Sun is cold. >Intension/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19