Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Causes: whether something is a physical cause of something depends on the separation of two objects or processes that are to be identified as cause and effect, as well as the transmission of energy. Whether this relationship comes about is therefore contingent. From a linguistic point of view, the relationship between cause and effect is a necessary relation since the concept of the cause is applied only to something which has an effect. See also de re, de dicto, necessity, contingency, causality, effect.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Gerhard Vollmer on Causes - Dictionary of Arguments

II 44
Cause/Physics/Vollmer: is nowhere on in physics - only effect. - This indeed appears as a physical quantity, but very limited (energy multiplied by time). - Especially natural philosophy refrains from causes - Without signaling no effect - signal: thus energy is transferred.
II 48
A definite cause is never necessary. - A cause can always be halved. - Therefore VsTradition: "cause and effects balance each other" is wrong.
II 49
We also speak of a cause when no energy transfer takes place: - E.g. the elastic collision of two equally heavy and equally fast balls will transfer energy - both to keep their energy - There is only a momentum transfer. - Solution: there a conserved quantity is transferred.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-05-15
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