|Incomplete symbols: This is an expression by B. Russell for phrases that cannot stand alone to be meaningful. (B. Russell, “On Denoting, in Mind”, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 56. (Oct. 1905), pp. 479-493.) For example, descriptions such as “the fattest man”. In “Principia Mathematica” Russell, however, distinguishes names as complete symbols from descriptions as incomplete symbols. What is crucial here is that the context or the use of the expression must contribute to the definition. See also subsententials, compositionality, Frege-Principle, names, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Grover, D. L. on Incomplete Symbols - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 319
Incomplete Symbol/Russell/Camp/Grover/Belnap/CGB/Grover: E.g. descriptions that are not clear in the translation -> E.g. "The present King of France is bald".
Incomplete symbol: is then the fragment in the source language.
Prosentential Theory/Grover: there is nothing that is "true" translated, but it is possible to grasp the meaning of the complete expressions which "is true" include._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994