Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Underdetermination/Empiricism/Quine: also through unmonitored data.
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XI 119
Underdetermination/Identity of theories/Quine/Lauener: theories: can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent - E.g. interchanging -electron/molecule-: makes true sentences false - "since the change is purely terminological, you can say that both versions express the same theory -" so they are empirically equivalent -" however, the predicates can be reconstructed in a way that the theories also become logically equivalent - E.g. empirically equivalent: Theory a) space infinite -" b) finite, objects shrink with distance from the center -" Again, the predicates can be rephrased in such a way that the theories are logically equivalent -" underdetermination: In order to prove them, it would have to have an influence on the empirical content -" Quine: almost impossible to find an example.
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XI 120
Underdetermination/Quine/Lauener: there are rivals to every infinite theory that are equivalent empirically, but not logically, and that cannot be made logically equivalent by reconstructing the predicates.
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Stroud I 217
Underdetermination/Theory/Theoretical terms/Entities/Quine/Stroud: the truths that the scientist introduces e.g. about molecules are not sufficiently determined by all the truths that he knows or can ever know about the normal objects -" (s) there could be several possible theories which imply the same set of truths about the normal objects, but differ in terms of the theoretical ones -" theoretical entities do not follow from the truths about normal things -" Quine/Stroud: for him, normal objects are also just hypotheses -" this is how all theories go beyond data -" underdetermination: also remains, if we included all past and future nervous stimuli of all people.
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I 234
Problem: even true sentences go beyond the data, are projections - therefore they cannot be known.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23