|Impossible World: possible worlds are determined by counterfactual descriptions, specifying conditions for the existence of objects or laws, or a listing of instanced properties. The existence of an impossible world is already excluded by the concept. However, an impossible world can e.g. be characterized by the fact that in it all propositions are true. Then, for an arbitrary sentence A applies A is true and non-A is true. Thus, existence is excluded for every object and property. See also possible worlds, modal logic, necessity, possibility, possible world semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Re III 113
Impossible world/contradictory conditional sentences/Stalnaker/Read: (not counterfactual, here the front link is impossibly true). - Solution: Impossible world, where every statement is true. - Then the contradictory conditional sentences are also all true. - Lewis: they are true in an empty way.
- Read: Worlds (or theories) are concluded with logical consequence. - then there is only one impossible world. - Problem/Read: if we reject EFQ, we need a range of worlds that are both possible and impossible._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001