|Incorrigibility, philosophy of mind: incorrigibility is an expression for the particular status of the certainty that our statements have about our own subjective states. This particular status is disputed by some authors. See also privileged access, private language, mental states, subjectivity, foreign psychological._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Certainty/Peacocke/(s): demonstrative way of givenness: guarantees that the object has properties that are determined by the perception (not that he has certain properties for sure) - in any case that these properties do not depend on other beliefs.
I 140 f
Infallibility/incorrigibility/immunity to error/perception: visual condition: E.g. "This man is bald": infallible in reference of "this man" - ((s) Not someone else who stands in front of him - stronger/(s).: definitely the man who is given perceptually - even stronger/(s): definitely the perceptual patterns - Peacocke: no identification, not of identity with something dependent, which is just not given - "There is (in this perception situation) no one, so he would be bald, but not this man." - presented by the perception at this location - it cannot be that the way of givenness refers to "this box" while this box is not the thing which is cubical - hallucination: also in this case the thought "Dummett amuses himself" is a thought about Dummett!
Immunity/infallibility/tradition/Evans: the judgement, to be the judgment of a specific content, can be constituted that this judgement responds to this condition - I/Evans: The reference may fail._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983