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Disposition: stimulus is here no single event, but universal. Not two similar ones, but repetition of the same.
Universal: the same, not two of a kind! -> Disposition and conjunctive make universals indispensable.
Unrealized entities: universals - not individual things. (otherwise infinite classes of duplicates)> possible world.
Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits.
Intensional abstraction: "dogness", "cake baking", "erring".
Sentence = universal - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change of the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p".
Object: accept that what singular terms denotes as values - (But singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness".
Unrealized possibilities: the various possible hotels at the corner: no identity by position! - At most as universals.
Universals/Quine: must be included in ontology: E.g. some zoological species are mutually fertile - Frege’s ancestors - Kaplan: "Some critics admire nobody but each other".
Numbers, functions (also in physics).
Universals/Names/Quine: tradition cannot argue that predicates such as "red" would have to be the name of universals: being a name is much more special than having a meaning - "Pegasizes" is not an attribute (Universal) but a predicate (term).
Universals/Quine: E.g. "Red": is the biggest red thing in the universe - even if it is distributed - E.g. income groups: each is a thing distributed in space and time which consists of various stages of different people - problem: distinction between spatio-temporal and conceptual distribution: E.g. graphic figure can be interpreted as consisting of more or less numerous triangles or squares - that is why universals are no concrete facts.
Universals/Quine: must be accepted as abstract entities, because names must always be substitutable (Frege, substitution principle).
Universals/Quine: a theory which deals only with objects can be rephrased in a way that it refers to universals - E.g. length of bodies instead of bodies - e.g. concrete: Inscription - abstract: notational form.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003