Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Universals: Universals are expressions for what objects can have in common, such as a particular color. Examples of universals are redness, roundness, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. What is undisputed is that we form terms to generalize and use them successfully. See also General terms, Generality, Generalization, Ontology, Existence, Conceptual realism, Realism, Ideas, Methexis, Sortals, Conceptualism, Nominalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Universals - Dictionary of Arguments
I 72 Disposition: stimulus is here no single event, but universal. Not two similar ones, but repetition of the same. Universal: the same, not two of a kind! -> Disposition and subjunctive make universals indispensable. Unrealized entities: universals - not individual things. (otherwise we would need infinite classes of duplicates). > Possible worlds/Quine, > counterparts. I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. I 286 Intensional abstraction: "dogness", "cake baking", "erring". I 332 Sentence = universal - Value of the variable: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change of the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 414 Object: accept that what singular terms denotes as values - (But singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". I 423 Unrealized possibilities: the various possible hotels at the corner: no identity by position! - At most as universals. --- II 220 Universals/Quine: must be included in ontology: E.g. some zoological species are mutually fertile - Frege’s ancestors - Kaplan: "Some critics admire nobody but each other". Numbers, functions (also in physics). --- VII (a) 10ff Universals/Names/Quine: tradition cannot argue that predicates such as "red" would have to be the name of universals: being a name is much more special than having a meaning - "Pegasizes" is not an attribute (Universal) but a predicate (term). --- VII (d) 73 Universals/Quine: E.g. "Red": is the biggest red thing in the universe - even if it is distributed - E.g. income groups: each is a thing distributed in space and time which consists of various stages of different people - problem: distinction between spatio-temporal and conceptual distribution: E.g. graphic figure can be interpreted as consisting of more or less numerous triangles or squares - that is why universals are no concrete facts. VII (d) 75 Universals/Quine: must be accepted as abstract entities, because names must always be substitutable (Frege, substitution principle). --- VII (f) 117 Universals/Quine: a theory which deals only with objects can be rephrased in a way that it refers to universals - E.g. length of bodies instead of bodies - e.g. concrete: Inscription - abstract: notational form._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20