Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Universals: universals are expressions for what objects may have in common, e.g. a certain color. Examples for universals are redness, roundness, difference, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. Nevertheless it is undisputed that we form terms for generalization and successfully use them. See also general terms, general, generalization, ontology, existence, conceptual realism, realism, ideas, participation, sortals, conceptualism, nominalism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Armstrong II 18
Universals/Lewis/Armstrong: economical theory: only postulate those properties and relations that are needed a posteriori for a scientific approach.
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Arm II 181
Universals/Lewis/Armstrong: I am not set on them. - More neutral: truth supervenes on what things there are and what completely natural properties and relations they instantiate. - Negative existence theorems and = predications are innocent- LewisVsphenomenalistic counterfactual conditionals (VsCounterfactual conditionals). - ((s) my perception would have been somewhat different.)
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Lewis V 244
Universal/Armstrong/Lewis: properties are not universals, - and not a substitute for universals. - And vice versa, properties are probably not a substitute for universals. - Lewis: I am committed to properties - If universals, then only a few. - Which there are, is important for the sciences. - Universals are not divisible. - Otherwise, they lead to exact duplicates. - None of this applies to properties.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24