Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Universals: universals are expressions for what objects may have in common, e.g. a certain color. Examples for universals are redness, roundness, difference, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. Nevertheless it is undisputed that we form terms for generalization and successfully use them. See also general terms, general, generalization, ontology, existence, conceptual realism, realism, ideas, participation, sortals, conceptualism, nominalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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III 82
Universals/Armstrong: must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world - false: to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs) - what universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined - but a posteriori: from discovery - no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones.
III 88
Stages/Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G) - 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation) - 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: his e.g. with a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uiU necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U (s) because of simple emerging properties) - Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances - the kind of "property" has an instance - Place pro universals in this sense.
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.
II 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single U instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together - but it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy - solution: thesis of truth maker is the individual instantiation itself -> 96 II, II 102.
II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
II 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical U is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-18