|Inscrutability, philosophy: the inscrutability of reference is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, “Word and Object”, 1960) for the problem that - even in a particular situation - it cannot be determined in principle to which object the use of an expression refers. See also uncertainty of translation, Gavagai, indeterminacy, reference, translation, pointing, ostension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Language/Grammar/Lewis/Loar: Lewis shares Quine's view of the inscrutability of the reference and denies that a particular grammar can be assigned to a community's language unless we have previously created an arbitrary measure of grammar evaluation. There are always different equally simple ways of analysis possible._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981
"Two Theories of Meaning"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976