Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Independence, philosophy: the concept of independence is relevant in the context of the countability of events. It is thus a question of whether an event is a condition, a sequence or a side effect of an event, or whether it is to be counted as a separate event. See also epiphenomenalism, cause, effect, dependency, relations, overlap, autonomy, overlap.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I 301
Absolutely independent/independence/Simons: is an object, if it is not generically dependent. - God/Simons: Problem: is it independent of its own thoughts? - In any case, he must be a monad, because the real parts of an object are separated from him. - The extreme strength of the concept of absolute independence limits its usefulness.
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I 302
E.g. weak independent: a continuant may still be dependent on a process in its interior. - The process must be separated from the continuant (because of the category difference). - E.g. (s) body not with its metabolism (or unity of all its processes or life story) identical. - Process and object can never be identical. - Event/continuant: are categorically different, and can therefore have no common part.
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I 325
Independence/nature/world/reality/Simons: There are things in nature that do not interact. - E.g. separate point events. - SimonsVsSchlick - SchlickVsSum: if it should not have internal relations, there are no sums in nature. - SimonsVsSchlick: yes. - Popper pro Schlick. - Therefore, difference in shape (with internal relations) meaningless. PopperVsShape theory.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987


> Counter arguments against Simons



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-21