|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Belief/faith /objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what is in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. - Either necessarily true or necessarily false. - But these do not express anything.
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Schiffer I 46
Belief / Stalnaker/Schiffer: with content "x believes that dogs have fleas" - without content: x is a belief.
Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be in under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
Representation/Dretske: fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) - by regularity for the representation.
SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met - Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist ((s) if it is intended to be non-mentalistic)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987