|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.|
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Belief/faith /objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what is in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. - Either necessarily true or necessarily false. - But these do not express anything.
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Schiffer I 46
Belief / Stalnaker/Schiffer: with content "x believes that dogs have fleas" - without content: x is a belief.
Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be in under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
Representation/Dretske: fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) - by regularity for the representation.
SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met - Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist ((s) if it is intended to be non-mentalistic).
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987