|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one. - III 90 In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value.
VI 63ff (where?)
Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs.
Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological.
Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior.
Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. - (DavidsonVsMcDowell).
Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world.
Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. - (Causality) - M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects.
Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Davidson)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000