|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as all sorts of different things (vagueness).
Paul and Elmer: faith does not produce sentences like legends - cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmar does not - If truth value does not matter, believing is no relative term - w believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p no term.
Belief/Quine: no relation - is related to the false sentence ... - Instead Church: Belief and knowledge just resembles quotes - (>opaque contexts).
Belief/Quine: E.g. Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna - in fact, he confuses Tullius with Lullus- two options: a) Tom does not believe that Cicero (Tullius) wrote the Ars Magna, he just confuses the names, i.e. he knows who wrote the Ars Magna - here Tullius does not purely appear in a referential way. b) he believes something wrong: then Tullius is purely indicative.
Stroud I 228
Belief/knowledge/Quine: knowledge is not part of belief - nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.
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Brandom I 790/791
Relational belief/Quine: brings with it a special epistemic access to or contact with objects and de re-attributions which include existence stipulations._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001