Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. See also belief, religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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I 365
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as all sorts of different things (vagueness).
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I 372
Paul and Elmer: faith does not produce sentences like legends - cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmar does not - If truth value does not matter, believing is no relative term - w believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p no term.
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VII 142
Belief/Quine: no relation - is related to the false sentence ... - Instead Church: Belief and knowledge just resembles quotes - (>opaque contexts).
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XII 34
Belief/Quine: E.g. Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna - in fact, he confuses Tullius with Lullus- two options: a) Tom does not believe that Cicero (Tullius) wrote the Ars Magna, he just confuses the names, i.e. he knows who wrote the Ars Magna - here Tullius does not purely appear in a referential way. b) he believes something wrong: then Tullius is purely indicative.
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Stroud I 228
Belief/knowledge/Quine: knowledge is not part of belief - nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

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Brandom I 790/791
Relational belief/Quine: brings with it a special epistemic access to or contact with objects and de re-attributions which include existence stipulations.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29