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Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author
Concept
Summary/Quotes
Sources
Chr. Peacocke on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments
I 196/197
Belief/Peacocke: relation "Bel": contains speakers: not just "someone has" but a specific object.
>Subject, >Thinking, >Propositional attitudes, >"It thinks", >I think, >First person.
((s) See also Donnellan: distinction referential/attributive,
((s) "Bel" = de re.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals
indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate
the page number. The corresponding books
are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24