Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II 174f
Truth/Belief/Knowledge/Nozick: four conditions: (1) p is true - (2) S believes that p - (3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. - (4) If p > S believes that p - improvement: if p were true, S would believe it. - That excludes the following: someone happens to look into a book and therefore believes p, but would otherwise not believe it. - Problem: you can believe something according to one method, and not believe the same thing according to another method.
II 180
Problem: Variant: truth or falsity of p affects the choice of method.
II 178
Trace: = connection to the fact: is given when a person fulfils (3) and (4). - (3) ensures the trace.
II 179ff
Belief/Truth/Nozick: assuming, there are different methods, and the belief depends on the method. - E.g. The grandmother sees her grandson and believes that he is doing well. - If he were dead, you'd also tell her he was fine. - It does not follow that when she sees him, she does not know that he is doing well. - E.g. A father believes that his son is innocent. - a) out of love - b) because of the evidence - Problem: if the choice of method depends on the truth/falsity - that a method fulfils conditions 1 - 4 is too strong, that it only fulfils one, too weak.
II 236
Belief/Knowledge/Disjunction/Conjunction/Probability/Nozick: Conjunction: we can believe it with connection to only one - disjunction: here we need both. - Adjunction: from the premises p, q, we can conclude the conjunction p & q as conclusion.
Probability: here, adjunction may fail, because the conjunction of two premises has a lower probability than each one individually. - Universal Generalization/Existence Generalization: we can believe it without connection to a particular instance.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-21