|Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that.
Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so.
McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something.
The subject may not even have reasons.
Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either.
McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons".
Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square.
Rorty VI 179
McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000