Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. - Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. - Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.
Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: (I 157) Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-21