Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 44
Def Belief/Davidson: a sentence plus interpretation considered to be true
Belief/Davidson/McDowell: we cannot get out of our beliefs.
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Rorty VI 36
Davidson/Rorty: most of our beliefs must be true. But not congruence subject/object, but: the pattern formed by truth is the same as the pattern formed by the justification that justifies it in our opinion.
Rorty VI 166
Brains in the Vessel/Davidson/Rorty: if they have always been in the tank, they have many beliefs about their actual tank-plus-computer environment, no matter what kind of input they receive.
Rorty VI 187
Davidson/Rorty: Most of our beliefs must be true. Beliefs are not more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior.
Rorty VI 205
Davidson/Sellars: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: beliefs can only be justified by beliefs. (McDowellVs).
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Dav I 25
Belief/Davidson: not language-dependent - DavidsonVsRussell: the objects used for identification of a belief do not need to belong to the realm of ​​knowledge of the believer.
Dav I 68
Belief/Deception/Error/Davidson: for identification each depends on other beliefs being in the background - the concept of chair or mouse cannot remain the same independent of its occurrence in different beliefs - you can have beliefs about guanacos from books and correctly identify them when you see one - but: despite knowing that G. is not a Lama, he could say "guanaco" at every Lama - in both cases, the content is not determined by the sight of guanacos, but by the fact that you have appropriated other concepts such as "animal" "Lama", "camel", "pet", etc.
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 127
Belief/Error/Deception/Davidson: beliefs have no objects that might correspond to reality (representations), but causes - these are publicly accessible (inter-subjective) objects - ((s) the meanings that play a role in beliefs, are individuated through the public objects - (through causes)).
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Frank I 649
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong: a speaker who wants to be understood, makes sure to be interpretable - the interpreter has no other material than the sounds the speaker emits in conjunction with other events.
Frank I 680
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong, because the use of our words (in relation to the objects) regularly gives them meaning - use theory.
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Perler/Wild
Perler I 107
Belief/Davidson: most must be correct: reason: the beliefs are identified by their place in the system of beliefs - there must be an endless number of true beliefs regarding this subject area - false beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter - thus they undermine the validity of the description of a belief as one which deals with its subject matter - thus false beliefs in turn undermine the assertion that a linked belief is wrong.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-19