|Overdetermination, philosophy: the concept of overdetermination has different meanings. A) The fulfillment of several conditions which are sufficient for the occurrence of an event alone, and whereby no further determination of the actual cause can be given. B) The simultaneous ability to attribute a property and its opposite, as far as this opposite of a property can be formulated. C) If the truth value (truth or falsehood) of a statement is concerned, the attribution of properties to objects which do not change the truth value is an overdetermination. See also indeterminacy, fulfillment, executability, determinism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Overdetermination/Schiffer/(s): if causal overdetermination is accepted, it must always be accepted. ((S) second subset of me.) - Then mental and neural causes would not be identical. - One thing should always be added to the other. - A mental event could never cause a body movement, except in the case of causal overdetermination. - Schiffer: this causal superfluity is unbelievable. Overdetermination: simultaneously by causal and mental causes.
Solution: identity of neural and mental events.
Event: these problems only occur when there is an ontology of real events. - (Schiffer: this is not certain).
Property dualism/Schiffer: supposes simultaneously physicalistic and irreducible mental (intentional) properties - SchifferVs: superfluous, which leads to over-determination.
Epiphenomenalism/Schiffer: here the causal relevance is inherited. - Schiffer: then sit is uperfluous in the explanation. (> Superdeterminacy)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987