Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Overdetermination, philosophy: the concept of overdetermination has different meanings. A) The fulfillment of several conditions which are sufficient for the occurrence of an event alone, and whereby no further determination of the actual cause can be given. B) The simultaneous ability to attribute a property and its opposite, as far as this opposite of a property can be formulated. C) If the truth value (truth or falsehood) of a statement is concerned, the attribution of properties to objects which do not change the truth value is an overdetermination. See also indeterminacy, fulfillment, executability, determinism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II 172
counterfactual conditional / overdetermination / knowledge / Nozick: counterfactual conditionals help to exclude cases of overdetermination. - That is, cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient for themselves. - II 174 e.g. Barn facades: if there are many fakes, one should not speak of knowledge. - II 175 counterfactual conditional: shows covariance.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-08-14
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