|Aboutness, being about philosophy: The context in which this expression occurs is the reference to a linguistic expression on something beyond its linguistic level. The being-about-something makes a decisive step that distinguishes objects from everything else. Objects cannot be about something. In this sense, also individual words are to be understood as objects. In a wider sense, actions can also be about something. See also intentionality, intentions, reference, self-reference, levels, description levels, pointing, circularity, subsententials._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
About/aboutness/sensation/Sellars: sensations are not "about". - There is no bond between words and immediate experience" - instead: word-world connection: between "red" and red things. - But not between "red" and a class of private red things._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977